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UTAH CODE 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DENISE A. HIRSCH, 
* 
Plaintiff-Appellant. BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. 
* Case No. 20966 
FRANK L. HIRSCH, 
* 
Defendant-Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Should respondent, father, be awarded a modification 
of a Decree of Divorce, changing custody of a minor child from 
the mother to the father, without a finding by the trial Court 
that a substantial change of circumstances occured after entry 
of said Decree which materially affected the mother's ability 
to parent the child. 
2. Should a prior award of custody of a minor child to 
the mother be modified awarding the father custody, without 
a finding that the mother is unfit, immoral, or otherwise 
incompetent. 
3. Did the trial Court have sufficient basis for deciding 
that it was in the best interests of the child that custody be 
changed from the mother to the father. 
4. Is the order for modification of the prior award of 
custody in the matter presently before the Court based on 
an abuse of discretion of the trial Court, such decision 
being inequitable and not conforming with statute and 
precedent case law. 
RELEVANT STATUTES 
U.C.A. 78-45c-12. A custody decree rendered by a 
Court of this state ... is conclusive as to all isues 
of law and fact decided and as to the custody determination 
made unless and until that determination is modified pursuant 
to law... 
U.C.A. 30-3-5. The court shall have continuing jurisdiction 
to make such subsequesnt changes or new orders with respect to 
... the custody of the children... as shall be reasonable and 
necessary. 
U.C.A* 30-3-10. In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interest of the child... 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case. This is an appeal from the final 
order entered by Judge Dean E. Conder of the Third District 
Court on defendant-father's Petition to Modify the Decree 
of Divorce, specifically changing custody of the minor child 
of the parties from the mother to the father. 
Disposition in lower court. The District Court ordered 
that the prior award of custody by modified, changing custody 
of the minor child from plaintiff-mother to defendant-father. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties in this matter were married on September 22, 1979. 
One child, Cody Dale Hirsch, born June 14, 1980, was born as issue 
of this marriage. The parties separated in February 1983. A 
Decree of Divorce was entered on May 2, 1984 by Judge Dean E. 
Conder of the Third District Court, awarding appellant-mother 
custody of the minor child.(p.18 L3-L5). 
Both during the separation and after the Decree of Divorce 
was entered, the respondent-father enjoyed liberal visitation 
with the minor child. 
In February of 1985, father filed a Petition for Modification 
seeking custody of the child.(p.20,21). After hearing in May 1985, 
the child was returned to the appellant-mother and visitation 
rights were specified for the respondent-father.(p. 35) 
After custody evaluations were performed, trial was 
held in this matter on October 15, 1985 before the Honorable 
Judge Dean E. Conder of the Third District Court. 
At trial respondent-father and his witnesses testified 
that the child had resided with the father a majority of 
of the time while the parties were separated prior to the 
divorce and also after the divorce, and the father himself 
specifically admitted that no change in circumstances had 
occured since the original order of custody was entered, 
(Transcript p.24 L8-L11). 
At trial, appellant-mother and her witnesses testified 
that the child had resided with the mother a majority of the 
time prior to the divorce from November of 1983 until the 
date of the divorce, May of 1984 (Transcript p.75 L20-L22) 
and continually from the date of the divorce in May of 1984 
until February of 1985 (Transcript p. 76 L16-L19). 
There was also testimony from both sides that the child 
was to have a visitation period with the father in February ,1985 
for approximately a two week period, afterwhich the father 
kept the child against the motherfs wishes for approximately 
a six week period, after which the Court returned the child 
to the mother. (Transcript p.24 L22-L25, p.25 LI and p.77 L10-
L22) . 
Other relevant facts are that the mother remarried soon 
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after the divorce, has a stable marriage relationship with 
her husband (Transcript p.64 L10-L14), is a homemaker, and 
is able to provide full-time care for the child herself. 
(Transcript p.75 L2-L4). 
The father works at least forty hours per week and 
usually works overtime (Transcript p.28 L19-L15, p.29 LI), 
and therefore is not able to provide care for the child 
himself. Since the child has been with the father by order 
of the Court beginning November 18, 1985, the child has 
been taken to his grandmother or a babysitter each morning 
at 7:00 AM ( Transcript p.54 L19-L21) where he receives 
his bath and three meals, after which the father takes him 
home for the evening. 
There was also testimony at trial of father's intentions 
to remarry on November 29, 1985, (Transcript p.57 L9-L14), 
which marriage did not take place, and father remains single. 
The trial Court ordered the modification of the Divorce 
Decree changing custody from the mother to the father based 
on findings that the evidence was conflicting as to which 
party had possession of the child from February 1983 until 
April 1985, mother moved from the state of Utah for a period 
of six-eight weeks during which time father had possession of 
the child, both parties were adequate parents, mother had 
remarried and father planned to remarry, and mother had moved 
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several times. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The ruling of the trial court modifying the prior order 
of custody should be reversed as it is contrary to and 
inconsistent with prior case law and the prevailing rule 
of law, as follows: 
1) The evidence does not support a finding of substantial 
change of circumstances. 
2) There was no evidence presented at trial, or finding 
made by the lowed court that any change in circumstance adversely 
affected the custodial parent-mother's ability to affectively 
parent the child. 
3) A change in custody from mother to father was not 
shown to be in the best interests of the child in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE LOWER COURT ORDER 
CHANGING CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD FROM MOTHER TO FATHER 
AS SUCH ORDER IS CONTRARY TO THE PREVAILING RULE OF LAW. 
The statutes cited above call for the prior award of 
custody to remain in effect unless modified pursuant to law, 
and that the best interests of the child be considered. 
The prevailing rule of law in regard to matter of 
modification of custody orders, as interpreted by this Court 
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is expressed in the case of Hogge v. Hogge, 649 Pac 2d 51, 
(Utah 1982) wherein Justice Oakes stated the following, 
"...a trial courts decision to modify a decree by 
transferring custody of aminor child must involve 
two separate steps. In the initial step, the court 
will receive evidence only as to the nature and 
materiality of any changes in those circumstances 
upon which the earlier award of custody was based. 
In this step the party seeking modification must 
demonstrate (1) that since the time of the previous 
decree, there have been changes in the circumstances 
upon which the previous award was based; and (2) that 
those changes are sufficiently substantial and material 
to justify reopening the question of custody. The trial 
court must make a separate finding as to whether this 
burden of proof has been met.... In the second step, 
having found that a substantial and material changein 
circumstance justifies a reconsideration of the custody 
award, the trial court must consider the changes in 
circumstances along with all other evidence relevant to 
the welfare or best interests of the child, including 
the advantage of stability in custody arrangements that 
will always weigh against changes in the party awarded 
custody." 
These requirements were re-affirmed by the Supreme Court 
in the subsequently decided case of Williams v. Williams, 
655 Pac 2d 652 (Utah 1982). 
In the case presently before the court there was a 
specific admission by the party seeking modification that 
no change in circumstance occured, thus the order for change 
of custody was improper, contrary to the rule stated above. 
II. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR A FINDING OF SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCE. 
There is insufficient basis for a finding of substantial 
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change of circumstance in the case presently before this 
Court. Although each party and their respective witnesses 
gave testimony in direct contradiction to the opposing 
party, whichever side the trier-of-fact may believe as 
to who the child was with a majority of the time, neither 
party or their witnesses testified to a change of circumstance, 
and the respondent-father specifically admitted that there had 
been no change in circumstances. 
The only change of circumstances in the Court findings 
was that the child had been with the father for an eight-week 
period, and that the mother had moved her residence several 
times. 
As explained previously, the eight-week period in 
which the father had possession of the child was against 
the mother's wishes. Additionally, there was no evidence that 
the mother's change of residence was detrimental to the child 
in any way. 
There is nothingto support the finding of substantial 
and material change of circumstances. 
III. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE 
AFFECTED THE CUSTODIAL-PARENT iMOTHER'S ABILITY TO PARENT THE CHILD. 
Both evaluators testified that the mother is a fit and 
adequate parent for the child (Transcript p.9 L2-L8 and 
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p.62 L19-L25, p.63 L1-L6, p.66 L17-L18). Also the trial 
court made a specific finding that both parties are 
adequate parents. 
Precedent case law sets forth the standard that a 
prior custody order can not be changed without a finding 
that the custodial parent is unfit, immoral or incompetent. 
This rule of law is set forth in Chase v. Chase, 387 Pac 2d 
556 (Utah 1963), 15 Utah 2d 81, wherein the trial court changed 
custody from the mother to the father without a finding that 
the mother was immoral, incompetent, or otherwise disqualified 
to have custody. The Utah Supreme Court reversed that ruling 
as improper and returned the child to the custody of his 
mother stating that 
" change of custody ... from mother to father after 
divorce decree had granted custody to mother/ was 
improper... where mother was not immoral, incom-
petent, or otherwise disqualified." 
Since there was no such finding in the case presently 
before the court, it was improper for the trial court to change 
the prior order of custody in this matter. 
IV. IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD TO BE IN 
THE CUSTODY OF THE MOTHER AS SHE CAN BEST PROVIDE FOR HIS CARE 
AND WELFARE. 
A general standard for custody awards was set forth 
in the case of Dearden v. Dearden, 388 Pac 2d 230 (Utah 1964), 
15 Utah 2d 105. 
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11
 A presumption obtains that it is for 
the best interests and welfare of a 
child of tender years to be with (his) 
mother." 
In the present case, the child is only five years old 
and still in need of the care of his mother. 
The presumption in favor of the mother is even greater 
where the mother had previously been awarded custody of the 
child. The specific issue of modification of prior custody 
awards was addressed in the case of Trego v. Trego, 565 Pac 2d 
74 (Utah 1977), 
"...where prior order of custody has been 
entered and the child(ren) appear to be 
well-adjusted and happy they should not 
be compelled to change their home." 
It is in the best interest of a child to remain with his 
custodial parent to maintain the stability of the child. 
Evaluators testified that the child was normal, happy and 
well-adjusted (Transcript p.62 L15-L18) living with his 
mother and step-father and attending school. 
The Supreme Court set forth factors to be taken into 
consideration in determining the childfs best interests 
in the case of Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 Pac 2d 38 (Utah 1982), 
One of the most important factors stated is the "ability to 
provide personal rather than surrogate care" for the child. 
In the present case, appellant-mother is remarried. Her 
husband is employed allowing mother to be at home and provide 
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full-time care for the child herself. Evidence showed that 
both the mother and her husband were good parents and had 
a good relationship with the child (Transcript p.64 L19-L22 
and p.9 L22-L25). Mother has provided and can continue to 
provide full-time care for the child herself, including 
getting the child off to school/preparing all meals for him, 
and generally performing all tasks involved in caring for 
a five-year-old boy. 
On the other hand, the father remains single, and did 
not remarry on November 29, 1985. The home environment consists 
of a father who is out of the home working all day, a five-
year-old boy, and a teenage daughter from a prior marriage 
who comes in and out of the home depending on the whims of 
her parents (Transcript p. 40 L22-L25, p.41 L1-L5). The 
child must spend his days with a babysitter who provides 
the majority of care for the child. As much as this father 
wants custody of this child, he simply can not provide the 
care that this child needs, which care the mother can and 
has provided for the child. 
It is in the best interests of this child to be cared 
for by his own mother at his own home, which mother has 
provided good and loving care for this child since his birth, 
and who sincerely wants to continue to provide such care for 
her child. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that the modification of the Decree 
of Divorce changing custody of the child from the mother 
to father is inconsistent with statute and prior case law, 
and is an abuse of discretion of the trial court. 
There was no substantial change of circumstance occuring 
after entry of the decree. There was no finding that a 
change in circumstance affected mother's ability to parent 
the child. There was no finding of the mother's incompetence 
or inability to parent the child. There was no basis for 
finding it is in the best interest of the child to reside 
with his father. Quite simply, none of the requirements for 
modification of a prior order of custody have been met by 
respondent. 
It is inequitable to both the child and the mother 
to change custody based on the evidence presented to the 
court and findings of the lower court. 
WHEREFORE, appellant-mother respectfully requests this 
honorable court reverse the findings and order entered in 
the court below and return custody of the minor child to 
appellant-mother as originally ordered in the decree of divorce. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CATHRYN JAM^SDN JUDD^ 
Attorney for Appellant 
ADDENDUM^TO^APPELLANT^S^BRIEF 
The following are the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law for Modification of Decree of Divorce, and the Order 
Modifying Decree of Divorce which are the subject matter of 
this appeal. 
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NOLAN J. OLSEN 
Utah State Bar No. 2464 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: 255-7176 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DENISE A, HIRSCH, 
vs. 
FRANK L. HIRSCH, 
Plaintiff, ] 
Defendant, ] 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
' OF LAW FOR MODIFICATION OF 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D84-1088 
Honorable Dean E. Conder 
Defendant's and Plaintiff's Order To Show Cause In Re: Modification 
of Divorce Decree having come on to be heard before the above entitled Court, 
the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge presiding, on the 15th day of October, 
1985, Plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney, Cathryn Judd, and 
defendant appearing in person and by his attorney, Nolan J. Olsen^ and plaintif 
and defendant having presented evidence to the Court and plaintiff and defendan 
each having testified and the Court having taken said matter under advisement 
and the Court having issued its memorandum decision and good cause appearing, 
therefore, the Court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1# Plaintiff and defendant were divorced on the 2nd day of May, 
1984. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant had been separated since approximately 
February 1983. 
3. That during the period from February 1983 until lApril 1985, 
there was conflicting evidence as to which party had the possession of the 
minor child of the parties. 
4. That plaintiff moved from the State of Utah in February 1985, 
and defendant had the care, custody and control of said minor child during 
the e4.ght (8) week period that plaintiff was in California. 
5. That custody evaluations were submitted to the Court and 
considered by the Court. 
6. That the Court determined by the evidence that both parties 
were adequate parents. 
7. That plaintiff has remarried in April 1984 and defendant plans 
to remarry in November 1985. 
8. That defendant had custody of the minor child from February 
1983 through April 1985, a great portion of the time although exact time 
periods are not determined. However, the evidence shows that plaintiff has 
moved frequently. 
9. From the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That there has been a substantial change of circumstances since 
the granting of the Decree. 
2. That it would be in the best interest of the minor child of 
the parties, to wit: CODY DALE HIRSCH, to live with his father and that 
consequently, the defendant, FRANK L. HIRSCH, should be awarded the care, 
custody and control of said minor child subject to reasonable and liberal 
/isitations in the plaintiff, DENISE A. HIRSCH. 
3. That plaintiff and defendant should each pay their own individual 
Sourt costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED this day of OCTOBER, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER 
District Court Judge 
NOLAN J* OLSEN 
Utah State Bar No. 2464 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: 255-7176 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DENISE A. HIRSCH, 
vs. 
FRANK L. HIRSCH, 
Plaintiff, ] 
Defendant. ] 
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D84-1088 
Honorable Dean E. Conder 
That the Divorce Decree be and the same Is hereby modified as 
follows: 
1. That defendant, FRANK L. HIRSCH, be and he is hereby awarded 
the care, custody and control of the minor child, to wit: CODY DALE HIRSCH, 
born June 14, 1980, subject to the plaintiff being awarded reasonable and 
lieberal visitation rights with said minor child. 
DATED this day of OCTOBER, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE DEAN E- CONDER 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE^OF^SERVICE 
It is hereby certified that four copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant were hand delivered to 
attorney for defendant-respondent, Nolen J. Olsen at 
8138 South State Street, Midvale, Utah 84047 on the 
tf day of January, 1986. 
Cathryn Jamison Jxxd&y 
